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Do human societies from around the world exhibit similarities in
the way that they are structured, and show commonalities in the
ways that they have evolved? These are long-standing questions
that have proven difficult to answer. To test between competing
hypotheses, we constructed a massive repository of historical and
archaeological information known as “Seshat: Global History Data-
bank.”We systematically coded data on 414 societies from 30 regions
around the world spanning the last 10,000 years. We were able to
capture information on 51 variables reflecting nine characteristics
of human societies, such as social scale, economy, features of gover-
nance, and information systems. Our analyses revealed that these
different characteristics show strong relationships with each other
and that a single principal component captures around three-
quarters of the observed variation. Furthermore, we found that dif-
ferent characteristics of social complexity are highly predictable across
different world regions. These results suggest that key aspects of
social organization are functionally related and do indeed coevolve
in predictable ways. Our findings highlight the power of the sciences
and humanities working together to rigorously test hypotheses
about general rules that may have shaped human history.
cultural evolution | sociopolitical complexity | comparative history |
comparative archaeology | quantitative history
The scale and organization of human societies changed dra-matically over the last 10,000 y: from small egalitarian groups
integrated by face-to-face interactions to much larger societies with
specialized governance, complex economies, and sophisticated
information systems. This change is reflected materially in public
buildings and monuments, agricultural and transport infrastruc-
ture, and written records and texts. Social complexity, however, is
a characteristic that has proven difficult to conceptualize and
quantify (1, 2). One argument is that these features of societies are
functionally interrelated and tend to coevolve together in pre-
dictable ways (3, 4). Thus, societies in different places and at dif-
ferent points in time can be meaningfully compared using an overall
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measure of social complexity (2). Several researchers have attemp-
ted to come up with a single measure to capture social complexity
(5–7), but a more common approach has been to use proxy mea-
sures, such as the population size of the largest settlement (7, 8),
number of decision-making levels (9), number of levels of settlement
hierarchy (10), or extent of controlled territory (11). Others have
criticized this approach on the grounds that these proposed mea-
sures focus too narrowly on size and hierarchy (12, 13) or that there
are multiple dimensions or variable manifestations of complexity
(14). However, another common view is that different societies
have unique histories and cannot be meaningfully compared in
this way (15). Indeed, most historians have abandoned the search
for general principles governing the evolution of human societies
(16, 17). However, although every society is unique in its own
ways, this does not preclude the possibility that common features
are independently shared by multiple societies. How can we study
both the diversity and commonalities in social arrangements found
in the human past?
In this paper, we address these issues by building a global historical
and archaeological database that takes into account the fragmentary
and disputed nature of information about the human past. To test
hypotheses about the underlying structure of variation in human
social organization, we apply a suite of statistical techniques to
these data, including principal component analysis (PCA). We then
compare evolutionary trajectories in world regions by plotting the
estimated first principal component (PC) of variation against time.
Building a Comparative Database of Human History
Previous attempts to address these questions have been limited
by a reliance on verbal arguments (15, 18, 19), comparisons in-
volving a small number of polities (20, 21), noncomprehensive
data samples (3, 22), or nonsystematic methods of data coding
and purely descriptive analyses (6, 23–25). To advance beyond
purely theoretical debates and comparisons based on limited
samples, we have built a massive repository of systematically
collected, structured historical and archaeological data known as
“Seshat: Global History Databank” (26) (Materials and Methods).
In collecting data, we used a targeted, stratified sampling technique
that aims to maximize the variation in forms of social organization
captured from as wide a geographic range as possible [thus min-
imizing pseudoreplication of data points (27)]. Specifically, we
divided the world into 10 regions and in each, selected three
locations or “Natural Geographic Areas” (NGAs), representing
early, intermediate, and late appearance of politically centralized
societies (Fig. 1). The construction of this databank has been accom-
plished in collaboration with a large number of historical and
archaeological experts. Our goal is to capture the state of the
art knowledge about past societies, including where information
is uncertain or there are disagreements between researchers
(Materials and Methods). The online version of the databank
(seshatdatabank.info/) illustrates how entries in the databank are
supported by explanations of coding choices and references (SI
Appendix, SI Methods).
Our unit of analysis is a polity: an independent political unit
that ranges in scale from groups organized as independent local
communities to territorially expansive, multiethnic empires. To
populate the databank, we coded information on all identifiable
polities (n = 414) that occupied each of the 30 NGAs at 100-y
time slices from the beginnings of agriculture (in some cases, as far
back as 9600 BCE) to the modern period (in some cases, as late as
1900 CE) (SI Appendix, SI Methods). To capture different aspects of
social complexity, we systematically collected data on 51 variables
that could be reliably identified and categorized from the historical
and archaeological records. These variables were then aggregated
into nine “complexity characteristics” (CCs) (Fig. 2A). The first set
of variables relates to the size of polities: polity population (CC1),
extent of polity territory (CC2), and “capital” population (the size of
the largest urban center; CC3). A second set of variables measures
hierarchical complexity (CC4), focusing on the number of control/
decision levels in the administrative, religious, and military hierar-
chies and on the hierarchy of settlement types (village, town, pro-
vincial capital, etc.). Government (CC5) variables code for the
presence or absence of official specialized positions that perform
various functions in the polity: professional soldiers, officers, priests,
bureaucrats, and judges. This class also includes characteristics of
the bureaucracy (e.g., presence of an examination system), the ju-
dicial system, and specialized buildings (e.g., courts). Infrastructure
(CC6) captures the variety of observable structures and facilities
that are involved in the functioning of the polity. Information sys-
tem (CC7) codes the characteristics of writing, record-keeping, etc.
We also record whether the society created literature on specialized
topics, including history, philosophy, and fiction (texts; CC8).
Finally, economic development is reflected in monetary system
(CC9), which represents the “most sophisticated” monetary in-
strument present in the coded society, and indicates the degree
of economic complexity that would be possible. Our data collection
process also allows us to incorporate uncertainty in this coding or
disagreement among sources (Materials and Methods).
Testing Hypotheses About the Evolution of Social
Complexity
To test between the different hypotheses laid out above, we analyzed
these data using PCA, which assesses the extent to which different
variables are tapping into shared dimensions of variation. We
expected CC1–CC3 to cluster tightly together, as they all measure
size, albeit in somewhat different ways. Beyond this, if the variation
in social organization across different societies can be meaningfully
captured by a single measure of social complexity, we would pre-
dict that the different CCs would correlate strongly with each other
and be captured in one PC of variation onto which all CCs load. If
social complexity is predictably multidimensional, then other PCs
capturing significant amounts of variation might also be present.
We hypothesized that social complexity could be captured by
two PCs (7). Size variables (CC1–CC3) should exhibit a strong
relationship with hierarchical organization (CC4), as hierarchy is
often thought to be a necessary mechanism for enabling effective
information flows in large polities (19). We refer to the combi-
nation of size and hierarchy as “scale” (Fig. 2A). The other variables
might form another dimension of “nonscale” complexity, perhaps
reflecting specialization of roles and the products that emerge from
such specialization. Another possibility is that these CCs covary
in other ways or are free to vary independently (that is, they do not
evolve together in a predictable manner). In the latter situation, we
would not expect correlational analysis or the PCA to reveal any
structure in terms of the relationships of these variables with each
other.
Significance
Do human societies from around the world exhibit similarities
in the way that they are structured and show commonalities in
the ways that they have evolved? To address these long-
standing questions, we constructed a database of historical
and archaeological information from 30 regions around the
world over the last 10,000 years. Our analyses revealed that
characteristics, such as social scale, economy, features of gov-
ernance, and information systems, show strong evolutionary
relationships with each other and that complexity of a society
across different world regions can be meaningfully measured
using a single principal component of variation. Our findings
highlight the power of the sciences and humanities working
together to rigorously test hypotheses about general rules that
may have shaped human history.
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Contrary to these expectations, all nine CCs showed substantial
and statistically significant correlations with each other, with coef-
ficients ranging from 0.49 to 0.88 (SI Appendix, Table S4). We found
that a single PC, PC1, explains 77.2 ± 0.4% of variance. The pro-
portion of variance explained by other PCs drops rapidly toward
zero (Fig. 2B). Furthermore, all CCs load equally strongly onto
PC1, indicating that PC1 captures contributions from across the
multiple measures of social organization used here (Fig. 2C and SI
Appendix). This result provides strong support for the hypothesis that
social complexity can be captured well by a single measure. In running
these analyses, we have to take into account a number of factors,
including missing data and various sources of autocorrelation. How-
ever, our results are robust to a large number of different assumptions
and potential sources of error and bias (SI Appendix, SI Results).
We can also test directly the idea that societies that developed
on distant world continents share enough similarities in their
Fig. 1. Locations of the 30 sampling points on the world map (the size of the dot reflects the antiquity of centralized societies within the world region). The
key to the numbers is in SI Appendix, Table S1.
Fig. 2. (A) Nine CCs (ovals) aggregating 51 variables (SI Appendix has details on all CCs). Line width and color are proportional to the correlation coefficients
between CCs (darker and thicker lines indicate stronger correlations). All CCs are significantly correlated with one another (correlation coefficients range
between 0.49 and 0.88). Some variables show stronger linkages with each other, such as the scale variables (ovals shaded in gray), whereas money is less
strongly correlated with the other variables. (B) Proportion of variance explained by PCs. (C) Factor loadings for CCs on PC1 indicating strong contributions by
all CCs to a single dimension of social complexity. CP, capital population; G, government; I, infrastructure; L, levels; M, money; PP, polity population; PT, polity
territory; T, texts; W, information system (writing).
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complexity dimensions to allow for meaningful comparisons. We
used the statistical technique of k-fold cross-validation (28), in
which models are fitted on one set of data (“training set”) and
evaluated on another independent set (“testing set”). We re-
served all data for polities in a particular world region, such as
North America, as the testing set; developed predictive models
on the rest of the data (by regressing each CC in turn on other
CCs); and then, used the fitted models to predict each CC for
North American polities. We then repeated this analysis for all
other world regions. The accuracy of prediction is measured by
the coefficient of prediction, ρ2, which approaches one if pre-
diction is very accurate, takes the value of zero when prediction
is only as good as simply using the mean, and can take negative
values if model prediction is worse than the mean.
Our results show that the values of CCs can be predicted by
knowledge of other CCs (Table 1), and as Table 2 shows, median
ρ2 ranges between 0.08 (Southeast Asia) and 0.91 (North Amer-
ica), indicating that this predictive ability holds across all world
regions. Low ρ2 values do occur for some variables and seem to be
lowest for those regions with the fewest number of polities to be
predicted (SI Appendix, SI Results). This is to be expected, as with
fewer cases to predict, there is less chance for general relationships
to be detected. Some decreases in ρ2 may also occur if smaller
societies adopt some of the features, which make up CCs, from
other societies, because they may be useful in dealing with larger
societies (perhaps especially aspects of money and writing). Such
selective adoption may not necessarily lead to the rapid devel-
opment of other aspects of complexity. Lower ρ2 may also occur if
some traits are retained when others are lost (see below).
Comparing Evolutionary Trajectories
Our results, thus, indicate that there is striking similarity in the
way that the societies in our global historical sample are organized.
Examining PC1 enables us to compare how social complexity
evolved in different parts of the globe over time. We plotted PC1
values estimated for each polity that occupied each of the 30 NGAs
at 100-y time intervals. Fig. 3 compares the trajectories of the NGAs
with early appearance of politically centralized societies in each
of the 10 world regions (SI Appendix has all 30 trajectories). These
trajectories indicate a general increase in complexity over time,
albeit with occasionally substantial decreases in complexity (29).
This comparison shows that there are crucial differences in the
timing of takeoff and the rate of change as well as level of social
complexity reached in different regions by 1900—differences that
become clearly revealed through the analyses performed here. For
example, although it is well-known that complex societies of the
Americas emerged later than those in Eurasia, using our data, we
can quantify their differences in social complexity. The difference
in PC1 levels indicates that societies in the Americas were not as
complex as those from Eurasia at time of contact, which may be a
contributing factor in explaining why European societies were able
to invade and colonize the Americas (30).
The tight relationships between different CCs provide support
for the idea that there are functional relationships between these
characteristics that cause them to coevolve (3). Scale variables
are likely to be tightly linked, since increases or decreases in size
may require changes in the degree of hierarchy (both too few and
too many decision-making levels create organizational problems)
(19). A similar argument has been put forward for size and gov-
ernance (20). The production of public goods, such as infrastruc-
ture, may require solutions to collective action problems (31), and
these can be provided by governance institutions and professional
officials (32). Despite these linkages, because of their nature, dif-
ferent CCs are likely to show different temporal dynamics. Levels
of nonscale characteristics, such as information systems, monetary
systems, or infrastructure, may be retained and used even if a polity
does decrease in size. Indeed, by retaining such features, the scale
of the polity may more readily bounce back and return to its former
level. This cultural continuity may be one reason why the trends that
we see in our data are for social complexity to increase over time in
a cumulative, ratchet-like manner (3, 33–35). For example, polities
in our Italian NGA had writing, texts, and coins before the dramatic
rises in scale of the Roman republic and empire, and they retained
these features after the fall of Rome.
Discussion
One major conclusion from these analyses is that key aspects of
human social organization tend to coevolve in predictable ways.
This result supports the hypothesis that there are substantial
commonalities in the ways that human societies evolve. Thus,
societies can be meaningfully compared along a single dimen-
sion, which can be referred to as social complexity. Our analyses
suggest that the estimated first PC of social complexity can be
interpreted as a composite measure of the various roles, insti-
tutions, and technologies that enable the coordination of large
numbers of people to act in a politically unified manner. How-
ever, as noted in the Introduction to this paper, the term “social
complexity” has previously been defined and discussed in many
ways. Indeed, complexity is a term that has many colloquial mean-
ings, and there are many valid ways in which it could be applied to
human social organization. For example, the kinship systems of
some Australian Aboriginal groups, such as the Aranda, involve
many complicated rules that determine who can marry whom
(36, 37), and Turkana pastoralists have sophisticated social rules
Table 2. Cross-validation results for out of sample prediction of
CCs summarized for different world regions
Predicted region
ρ2
nMedian Minimum Maximum
Africa 0.72 0.37 0.90 41
Central Eurasia 0.63 −0.38 0.86 9
East Asia 0.70 0.30 0.93 34
Europe 0.53 −0.31 0.84 43
North America 0.91 0.79 0.97 11
Oceania–Australia 0.14 −3.21 0.97 1
South America 0.74 −24.57 0.97 5
South Asia 0.46 −0.05 0.69 12
Southeast Asia 0.08 −4.27 0.91 8
Southwest Asia 0.71 0.19 0.79 39
All regions 0.62 0.53 0.84 203
Prediction accuracy is measured with prediction ρ2 (SI Appendix, Table S2).
Median, minimum, and maximum indicate the median, smallest, and largest
ρ2 values across the nine CCs for the region, respectively.
Table 1. Cross-validation results for out of sample prediction of
CCs across all world regions
Predicted CC Overall ρ2
Polity population 0.84
Polity territory 0.76
Capital population 0.71
Levels of hierarchy 0.60
Government 0.53
Infrastructure 0.62
Information system 0.59
Texts 0.73
Monetary system 0.53
Prediction accuracy is measured with prediction ρ2 (SI Appendix, Table S2).
Overall ρ2 values are calculated as an average of the ρ2 values weighted by
the number of polities from which they are drawn.
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and norms that enable them to join together in large groups to
conduct cooperative raiding missions (38).
Building historical databases, such as Seshat, allows us to take
the vast amount of information about the human past and use it
to test and reject competing hypotheses in the same cumulative
process that characterizes the sciences (39, 40). It is important to
emphasize that we attach no normative judgment to the measure
of social complexity that we have identified here; more complex
societies are not necessarily “better” than less complex societies.
We need to separate out these issues as well as ethnocentric
judgments about non-European societies (2) from the kind of
questions about how societies have actually evolved that we
address here (3).
Our purpose here is not to propose that one definition of
social complexity is superior to another. Instead, by supplying
evidence that at least some aspects of human societies evolve in
predictable and interconnected ways, this study illustrates that it
is possible to move beyond the kind of verbal arguments that too
often dominate debates about the evolution of human social
organization. Furthermore, quantitative comparative analysis forces
us to be more explicit about the evidence needed to support dif-
ferent claims and brings greater clarity to debates and discussions.
It is important to recognize that, in any study, including this one,
there are many subjective judgments about the coding of variables.
Our goal in establishing the databank is to provide a summary of
what is currently known about past human societies based on the
literature and the expert knowledge of academics. It is not our aim
to provide a more objective or definitive representation of such
evidence but rather, to make the decisions and assumptions behind
our data more explicit than has often been the case in the past. Our
databank thus allows others viewing these data to challenge these
decisions and provide alternative assessments. Future analyses can
then assess whether alternative coding decisions substantially affect
the results presented here.
The choice of variables and CCs themselves is also an important
consideration in evaluating these results. We have attempted to be
inclusive by choosing variables that would not favor particular
forms of governance from certain parts of the world as being more
complex. The variables are broad enough to allow for such features
to come from a variety of specific institutions and are not biased
toward Western forms of governance, which ultimately have their
origins in early states in Greece and Mesopotamia. Our govern-
ment variables (CC5), for example, capture the degree of special-
ization and professionalization of those involved in decision-making
in sociopolitical affairs, a characteristic that has long been central to
discussion of social complexity in different parts of the world (41).
Our information system and texts variables (CC7 and CC8, re-
spectively) capture the extent to which different types of informa-
tion are being recorded and transmitted and reflect diversity and
specialization in learning. Such information is potentially important
in organizing societies or enabling societies to solve adaptive prob-
lems. Again, the variables within this category are broad enough to
not be specific to any particular cultural tradition a priori. In
particular, writing has been independently invented in such distant
world regions as western Eurasia, east Asia, and Mesoamerica. As
with the coding of specific variables, future analyses could assess
whether the inclusion of alternative variables substantially affects
the results presented here. Importantly, if our choice of variables
was biased toward certain cultural–historical traditions, then this
would reduce the correlations between different aspects of com-
plexity, and these patterns would be different in different parts of
the world. However, the overall high degree of correlation between
CCs, as our cross-validation results indicate, suggests that the
patterns that we have identified are relatively stable across regions.
The approach that we have taken in this paper can be used to
resolve other long-standing controversies in the study of human
societies. For example, some researchers have argued that traditional
approaches to social complexity have overemphasized hierarchical
relationships and did not pay enough attention to more horizontal
or heterarchical forms of complexity (13, 42). Power relationships
within societies can range from being autocratic or exclusionary
(certain individuals or groups aim to control sources of power) to
more corporate/collective, in which power is broadly shared across
different sectors of societies (12, 43, 44). Other authors have
Fig. 3. Trajectories of social complexity in 10 world regions quantified by
PC1 values for locations where centralized, hierarchical polities first appeared in a
particular region. (A) Africa and east Asia. Broken lines indicate 95% confidence
intervals. (B) Southwest Asia, south Asia, Europe, and central Asia. (C) Southeast
Asia, North America, South America, and Oceania. Confidence intervals for B and C
are shown in SI Appendix, Figs. S4 and S5. PC1 has been rescaled to fall between
0 (low complexity) and 10 (high complexity) to aid interpretation. Flat horizontal
lines indicate periods when there is no evidence of change from our polity data.
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identified additional patterns that might be seen in human social
evolution (21, 45), which can be fruitfully studied with the ap-
proach in this article. Indeed, some of the features that we have
already coded, such as types and numbers of official positions, could
be important in addressing such issues. We are already collecting
data to test the idea that the balance between autocratic and
collective forms of power has changed systematically over time,
with autocratic forms being more prevalent in chiefdoms and
early states. The emergence of institutions that held despotic
leaders to account is argued to have occurred later (26), perhaps
in connection with the emergence of certain religions (46, 47).
Our approach is also well-suited to go beyond identifying
patterns and investigate the processes of sociopolitical evolution.
The systematic compilation of long-term diachronic data for
multiple variables on a large number of societies has been rel-
atively rare in comparative history and archaeology (refs. 20, 35,
and 48–50 have comparative studies of evolutionary trajectories
for a smaller number of cases or time periods). Previous large-
scale comparative approaches have generally focused on comparing
evolutionary outcomes (end points) or snapshots at a single period
of time rather than entire long-term trajectories (25, 51–54). By
analyzing trajectories, we can both examine the processes that lead
to variation in human societies across space and time and also take
into account the historical changes that are contingent on the
particular conditions and past history of the societies involved
(3, 4, 55, 56).
In this study, the focus on looking at comparative changes over
time enables us to investigate questions about the tempo of
evolutionary change in human social systems. One pattern that is
already apparent (Fig. 3 and SI Appendix, Fig. S6) is that many
trajectories exhibit long periods of stasis or gradual, slow change
interspersed with sudden large increases in the measure of social
complexity over a relatively short time span. This pattern is
consistent with a punctuational model of social evolution, in
which the evolution of larger polities requires a relatively rapid
change in sociopolitical organization, including the development
of new governing institutions and social roles, to be stable (3, 4,
57). One example that has been investigated in previous work is
the emergence of bureaucratic forms of governance, which tend
to develop around the time when polities first extend political
control beyond more than a day’s round trip from the capital
(20). A related idea is that, if there are strong relationships be-
tween these variables and if change is relatively rapid, then so-
cieties may tend to evolve toward certain types of sociopolitical
organization based on associations between certain combinations
of traits (3, 24, 57). Cluster analysis of PC1 shows some initial
support for this idea, indicating a clear distinction between large
societies that exhibit many of the nonscale features of complexity
and smaller societies that lack most of these features, with other
potential groupings within these clusters (SI Appendix, SI Dis-
cussion and Figs. S12 and S13).
Our data also indicate a shift toward more complex societies
over time in a manner that lends support to the idea of a driving
force behind the evolution of increasing complexity (3, 10, 58,
59) (SI Appendix, SI Discussion, Fig. S11, and Table S9). Such a
driven trend is consistent with the hypothesis that competition
between groups, particularly in the form of warfare, has been an
important selective force in the emergence and spread of large,
complex societies (10, 11, 60). In future work, the kind of sys-
tematic approach that we have used here will allow us to assess
the large number of alternative mechanisms that have been
proposed to explain the evolution of social complexity (2, 11, 14,
26). We are currently expanding the Seshat databank to collect
information on agricultural productivity, warfare, religion, ritual,
institutions, equity, and wellbeing in past societies to assess such
competing hypotheses (26, 47, 61, 62).
Our focus in this paper has been on the increase in social com-
plexity over time. However, understanding the causes of collapses
and decreases in social complexity is an equally important research
topic. As is clear in the evolutionary trajectories (Fig. 3 and SI
Appendix, Fig. S6), declines in social complexity, some quite dra-
matic, are frequently seen in most NGAs. Furthermore, some of
the large decreases are “hidden” when a polity collapses, but the
NGA is immediately taken over by another large-scale society
nearby. While different analytical approaches than the ones used
in this article and additional data will be needed to study the
processes explaining social collapse, such an investigation is entirely
within the scope of the Seshat project.
In summary, our results indicate that it is indeed possible to
meaningfully compare the complexity of organization in very
different and unconnected societies along a single dimension
(6, 30). Although societies in places as distant as Mississippi
and China evolved independently on different continents and
followed their own trajectories, the structure of social organi-
zation, as captured by the interrelations between different CCs, is
broadly shared across all continents and historical eras. Key ele-
ments of complex social organization have thus coevolved in highly
consistent ways across time and space. Differences in the timing of
takeoff, the overall rate of increase, and the depth of periodic de-
clines in social complexity provide us with highly informative data
for testing theories of social and cultural evolution. Our databank
was built via a collaborative relationship with humanities scholars
who provided expert knowledge of past societies and helped
guide data collection at all stages. This paper has shown the power
of the sciences and the humanities working together to help us
better understand the past by testing and rejecting alternative hy-
potheses about the general rules that have shaped human history.
Materials and Methods
Data. Data were collected as part of “Seshat: Global History Databank” (26)
(SI Appendix, SI Methods). We collected data in a systematic manner by di-
viding the world into 10 major regions (Fig. 1 and SI Appendix, Fig. S1 and
Table S1). Within each region, we selected three NGAs to act as our basic
geographical sampling unit. Each NGA is spatially defined by a boundary
drawn on the world map that encloses an area delimited by naturally occurring
geographical features (for example, river basins, coastal plains, valleys, and
islands).
Within each world region, we looked for a set of NGAs that would allow us
to cover as wide a range of forms of social organization as possible. Ac-
cordingly, we selected three NGAs that varied in the antiquity of centralized,
stratified societies (giving us one early-complexity, one late-complexity, and
one intermediate-complexity NGA per region).
Our unit of analysis is a polity, an independent political unit that ranges in
scale from villages (local communities) through simple and complex chief-
doms to states and empires. To code social complexity data, for each NGA, our
team chronologically listed all polities that were located in the NGA or
encompassed it (SI Appendix, SI Methods has a discussion of how we deal
with cases where identifying a single polity is not appropriate). For each
NGA, we start at a period just before the Industrial Revolution (typically
1800 or 1900 CE depending on the location) and go back in time to the
Neolithic (subject to the limitation of data). We chose a temporal sampling
rate of 100 y, meaning that we only included polities that spanned a century
mark (100, 200 CE, etc.) and omitted any polities of short duration that only
inhabited an NGA between these points. Data collection was accomplished
by a team of research assistants guided by archaeologists and historians who
are experts in the sampled regions and time periods. These experts also
checked all data collected by research assistants. SI Appendix, SI Methods
contains details about coding procedures, including how we decided on the
variables to include in the Seshat codebook and how we explicitly engaged
with such issues as missing data, uncertainty, and disagreement between
experts. We have created a website (seshatdatabank.info/) that illustrates
the databank. This online version currently displays information on the so-
cial complexity variables in the NGAs and polities analyzed in this study (see
also SI Appendix, SI Methods). The website shows how entries in the data-
bank are supplemented by explanations of coding decisions and references.
The goal of the databank is to make as explicit as possible the evidentiary
basis of inferences about the past and to share that information as widely
as possible.
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Multiple Imputation: Dealing with Missing Data, Uncertainty, and Expert
Disagreement. Because of the fragmentary nature of the information that
is available about past societies, it was not possible to reliably code all var-
iables for all polities. There is, therefore, a nontrivial amount of data points
for which we have been unable to assign even a broad range of possible
values because of a lack of evidence (3,700 of the total of 21,000). The
presence of suchmissing data is an important feature of our dataset, in that it
accurately reflects our current understanding (or lack of it) about any par-
ticular feature in any particular past society. Missing data, however, present a
challenge for the statistical analyses.
One way of dealing with incomplete datasets is to simply omit the rows in
the data matrix that contain missing values. There are two problems with this
approach. First, it can be very wasteful in that omitted rows may contain
much useful information relating to the variables that we were able to code.
Had we used this approach with our social complexity data, for example, we
would have to throw away nearly one-half of the rows. Second, case deletion
may lead to biased estimates, because there are often systematic differences
between the complete and incomplete cases. In our case, in many NGAs, small-
scale societies were present far back in time, and as a result, they are much
harder to code. Additionally, some regions of the world have been subject to
greater levels of research effort thanothers. Omittingmanyof the lesser known
cases because of their larger proportion of missing values would give too much
weight to later, better known societies fromonly someparts of theworld. As an
example, had we used the casewise deletion approach for our current dataset,
we would end up with only a single observation for Australia–Oceania. Such
unequal dropping of observations would very likely bias the results, since the
analysis would be dominated by such regions as Europe and southwest Asia
(each with ∼40 complete rows in the data matrix).
To deal with missing values as well as incorporate uncertainty and expert
disagreement into our analyses, we use a technique known as multiple im-
putation (63), which utilizes modern computing power to extract as much
information from the data as possible. Imputation involves replacing missing
entries with plausible values, and this allows us to retain all cases for the
analysis. A simple form of imputation, “single imputation,” might replace any
unknown cases for a binary “present/absent” variable with simply “absent” or
to replace unknown cases of continuous variables with the mean for that
variable. These approaches have similar drawbacks to case deletion, in that
they tend to introduce a bias. Therefore, in this paper, we perform multiple
imputation: analysis done on many datasets, each created with different im-
puted values that are sampled in probabilistic manner. This approach results in
valid statistical inferences that properly reflect the uncertainty caused by
missing values (64). Multiple imputation procedures can vary depending on
the type of variable and the type of data coding issue faced.
Expert disagreement. In cases where experts disagree, each alternative coding
has the same probability of being selected. Thus, if there are two conflicting
codings presented by different experts and if we create 20 imputed sets, each
alternative will be used roughly 10 times.
Uncertainty. Values that are coded with a confidence interval are sampled
from a Gaussian distribution, with mean and variance that are estimated
assuming that the interval covers 90% of the probability. For example, if a
value of [1,000–2,000] was entered for the polity population variable, we
would draw values from a normal distribution centered on 1,500 with an SD
of 304. It is worth noting that this procedure means that, in 10% of cases,
the value entered into the imputed set will be outside the data interval
coded in Seshat. For categorical or binary variables, we sample coded values
in proportion to the number of categories that are presented as plausible.
For example, if our degree of knowledge does not allow us to tell whether a
certain feature was present or absent at a particular time, then the imputed
datasets will contain “present” for roughly one-half of the imputed sets and
absent for roughly one-half of the sets.
Missing data. For missing data, we impute values as follows. Suppose that, for
some polity, we have a missing value for variable A and coded values for
variables B–H. We select a subset of cases from the full dataset, in which all
values of A–H variables have values and build a regression model for A. Not
all predictors B–H may be relevant to predicting A, and thus, the first step is
selecting which of the predictors should enter the model (information on
model selection is given below). After the optimal model is identified, we
estimate its parameters. Then, we go back to the polity (where variable A is
missing) and use the known values of predictor variables for this polity to
calculate the expected value of A using the estimated regression coeffi-
cients. However, we do not simply substitute the missing value with the
expected one (because as explained above, this is known to result in biased
estimates). Instead, we sample from the posterior distribution characterizing
the prediction of the regression model (in practice, we randomly sample the
regression residual and add it to the expected value). We applied the same
approach to each missing value in the dataset, yielding an imputed dataset
without gaps.
The overall imputation procedure was repeated 20 times, yielding 20 im-
puted sets that were used in the analyses below. The 20 imputed datasets are
available online as Dataset S1.
Statistical Analysis.
PCA. PCA was used to investigate the internal correlation structure charac-
terizing the ninemeasures of social complexity. PCAwas run on each imputed
dataset to estimate the proportion of variance explained by each PC (PC1–
PC9), component loadings (correlations between the original variables and
the PCs), and the values of PCs for each polity. Because we have 20 sets of all
of these results, we also report the confidence intervals associated with
these estimates. Values for PC1 derived from the 20 imputed datasets are
available online as Dataset S2.
Cross-validation. For the multiple imputation to be a worthwhile procedure,
we need to ascertain that the stochastic regression approach for predicting
missing values actually yields better estimates than, for example, simply using
the mean of the variable. To do this, we used a statistical technique known as
k-fold cross-validation (28). In addition to this methodological issue, this
cross-validation procedure allows us to address another substantive question,
namely the extent to which the relationships between variables are consistent
across different parts of the world. This is done by quantifying how well we can
predict the value of a particular feature of a particular society based on known
information about the values of other features in that society and the observed
relationships between the known and the unknown variables in other societies.
Cross-validation estimates the true predictability characterizing a statis-
tical model by splitting data into two sets. The parameters of the statistical
model are estimated on the fitting set. Next, this fitted model is used to
predict the data in the testing set. Because the prediction is evaluated on the
“out of sample” data (data that were not used for fitting the model), the
results of the prediction exercise give us a much better idea of how gener-
alizable the model is compared with, for example, such regression statistics
as the coefficient of determination, R2.
The accuracy of prediction is often quantified with the coefficient of
prediction (65):
ρ2 = 1−
Pn
i=1

Y *i −Yi
2
Pn
i=1

Y −Yi
2 ,
where Yi indicates the observations from the testing set (the omitted val-
ues), Y*i is the predicted value,
Y is the mean of Yi, and n is the number of
values to be predicted. The coefficient of prediction ρ2 equals one if all data
are perfectly predicted and zero if the regression model predicts as well as
the data average (in other words, if the model is simply Y*i =
Y). Unlike the
regression R2, which can vary between zero and one, prediction ρ2 can be
negative—when the regression model predicts data worse than the data
mean. Prediction ρ2 becomes negative when the sum of squares of devia-
tions between predicted and observed is greater than the sum of squares of
deviations from the mean.
In k-fold cross-validation, rather than having simply a single fitting set
and one testing set, we divide the data into k sets. We selected those cases
that had complete coding for all variables and divided our dataset into
10 sets for each of our 10 world regions. Next, we set aside one region (for
example, Africa) and used the other nine regions to fit a regression model
for the variable of interest. Let us say that Y is polity population, and we are
interested in how well it can be predicted from knowing the population of
the capital, hierarchy levels, writing, etc. We fit a regression model to the
data from the other nine regions. We then predict the values of Y (polity
population in this case) for Africa using the known values for other variables
in African polities and the regression coefficients. Next, we omit another
region (for example, Europe) and repeat the exercise. At the end, we have
predicted all data points by the out of sample method, while fitting the
model on 9/10th of data at any given step.
One important aspect of this procedure is to guard against overfitting
(i.e., including too many predictor variables in the model), which is known
to yield much worse predictability than a model that uses the “right” number
of predictors (66). We have experimented with several methods of model
selection that prevent overfitting. We found that a frequentist approach in
which predictor variables are selected based on their P values (using the
0.05 threshold) does as well as the more commonly used model selection
approach using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (66). In fact, AIC tended
Turchin et al. PNAS Early Edition | 7 of 8
A
N
TH
RO
PO
LO
G
Y
PN
A
S
PL
U
S
to slightly overfit compared with the frequentist approach. As the frequentist
approach has an additional advantage of consuming less computer time, we
used this approach for all cross-validation analyses reported below.
Multiple imputation, cross-validation, and PCA were all conducted using
scripts written in the R statistical programming language (67).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. We thank Paula and Jerry Sabloff, Santiago Giraldo,
and Carol Lansing who contributed to the development of Seshat. We also
acknowledge Prof. Garrett Fagan, who passed away on March 11, 2017. He
was a valued contributor to the Seshat Databank project, helping at an early
stage in developing a coding scheme for social complexity variables and
overseeing the coding of Roman polities. This work was supported by a John
Templeton Foundation Grant (to the Evolution Institute) entitled “Axial-Age
Religions and the Z-Curve of Human Egalitarianism,” a Tricoastal Foundation
Grant (to the Evolution Institute) entitled “The Deep Roots of the Modern
World: The Cultural Evolution of Economic Growth and Political Stability,”
Economic and Social Research Council Large Grant REF RES-060-25-0085 entitled
“Ritual, Community, and Conflict,” an Advanced Grant from the European Re-
search Council under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innova-
tion Programme Grant 694986, and Grant 644055 from the European Union’s
Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme (ALIGNED; www.aligned-
project.eu). T.E.C. is supported by funding from the European Research Council
(ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation pro-
gramme (Grant Agreement 716212).
1. Kohler TA, Crabtree SA, Bocinsky RK, Hooper PL (2015) Sociopolitical evolution in
midrange societies: The pre-Hispanic Pueblo case. Available at https://www.santafe.edu/
research/results/working-papers/sociopolitical-evolution-in-midrange-societies-the.
Accessed May 24, 2017.
2. Carneiro RL (2003) Evolutionism in Cultural Anthropology (Westview, Boulder, CO).
3. Currie TE, Mace R (2011) Mode and tempo in the evolution of socio-political orga-
nization: Reconciling “Darwinian” and “Spencerian” evolutionary approaches in
anthropology. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 366:1108–1117.
4. Spencer CS (1990) On the tempo and mode of state formation–Neoevolutionism re-
considered. J Anthropol Archaeol 9:1–30.
5. White LA (1949) The Science of Culture: A Study of Man and Civilization (Farrar,
Straus and Company, New York).
6. Morris I (2013) The Measure of Civilization: How Social Development Decides the Fate
of Nations (Princeton Univ Press, Princeton).
7. Chick G (1997) Cultural complexity: The concept and its measurement. Cross Cult Res
31:275–307.
8. Ortman SG, Cabaniss AHF, Sturm JO, Bettencourt LMA (2015) Settlement scaling and
increasing returns in an ancient society. Sci Adv 1:e1400066.
9. Currie TE, Mace R (2009) Political complexity predicts the spread of ethnolinguistic
groups. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 106:7339–7344.
10. Spencer CS, Redmond EM (2001) Multilevel selection and political evolution in the
Valley of Oaxaca, 500-100 BC. J Anthropol Archaeol 20:195–229.
11. Turchin P, Currie TE, Turner EAL, Gavrilets S (2013) War, space, and the evolution of
Old World complex societies. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 110:16384–16389.
12. Blanton RE, Feinman GM, Kowalewski SA, Peregrine PN (1996) A dual-processual
theory for the evolution of Mesoamerican civilization. Curr Anthropol 37:1–14.
13. Keech McIntosh S (1999) Beyond Chiefdoms: Pathways to Complexity in Africa, ed
Keech McIntosh S (Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge, UK), pp 1–30.
14. Feinman G (2013) Cooperation and Collective Action: Archaeological Perspectives, ed
Carballo DM (Univ Press of Colorado, Boulder, CO), pp 35–56.
15. Yoffee N (2005)Myths of the Archaic State: Evolution of the Earliest Cities, States, and
Civilizations (Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge, UK).
16. Hunt L (1989) The New Cultural History (Univ of California, Berkeley, CA).
17. Sheehan JJ (2005) President’s Column: How do we learn from history? Perspect Hist
43:1–3.
18. Feinman GM (2008) Variability in states: Comparative frameworks. Soc Evol Hist 7:
54–66.
19. Turchin P, Gavrilets S (2009) Evolution of complex hierarchical societies. Soc Evol Hist
8:167–198.
20. Spencer CS (2010) Territorial expansion and primary state formation. Proc Natl Acad
Sci USA 107:7119–7126.
21. Drennan RD, Peterson CE (2006) Patterned variation in prehistoric chiefdoms. Proc
Natl Acad Sci USA 103:3960–3967.
22. Feinman GM, Neitzel J (1984) Advances in Archaeological Method and Theory, ed
Schiffer MB (Academic, Orlando, FL), Vol 7, pp 39–102.
23. Currie TE (2014) Developing scales of development. Cliodynamics 5:65–74.
24. Peregrine PN, Ember CR, Ember M (2004) Universal patterns in cultural evolution: An
empirical analysis using Guttman scaling. Am Anthropol 106:145–149.
25. Peregrine P, Ember CR, Ember M (2007) Modeling state origins using cross-cultural
data. Cross-Cultural Res 41:75–86.
26. Turchin P, et al. (2015) Seshat: The Global History Databank. Cliodynamics 6:77–107.
27. Eff EA, Does Mr (2004) Galton still have a problem? Autocorrelation in the standard
cross-cultural sample. World Cult 15:153–170.
28. Kohavi R (1995) A study of cross-validation and bootstrap for accuracy estimation and
model selection. Proceedings of the 14th International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., San Francisco), Vol 2, pp 1137–1145.
29. Currie TE, Greenhill SJ, Gray RD, Hasegawa T, Mace R (2010) Rise and fall of political
complexity in island South-East Asia and the Pacific. Nature 467:801–804.
30. Diamond J (1997) Guns, Germs and Steel (Vintage, London).
31. Gavrilets S (2015) Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups. Philos Trans R
Soc Lond B Biol Sci 370:20150016.
32. Mattison SM, Smith EA, Shenk MK, Cochrane EE (2016) The evolution of inequality.
Evol Anthropol 25:184–199.
33. Richerson PJ, Boyd R (2001) The Origin of Human Social Institutions, ed Runciman WG
(Oxford Univ Press, Oxford), pp 197–234.
34. Henrich J (2015) The Secret of Our Success: How Culture Is Driving Human Evolution,
Domesticating Our Species, and Making Us Smarter (Princeton Univ Press, Princeton).
35. Marcus J (1998) The peaks and valleys of ancient states: An extension of the dynamic
model. Archaic States (School of American Research Press, Santa Fe, NM), pp 59–94.
36. Denham WW, McDaniel CK, Atkins JR (1979) Aranda and Alyawara kinship: A
quantitative argument for a double helix model. Am Ethnologist 6:1–24.
37. Cook M (2003) A Brief History of the Human Race (Granta Books, London).
38. Mathew S, Boyd R (2011) Punishment sustains large-scale cooperation in prestate
warfare. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 108:11375–11380.
39. Dunbar RIM (1995) The Trouble with Science (Fabe & Faber, London).
40. Collins R (1994) Sociological Forum (Springer, Berlin), Vol 9, pp 155–177.
41. Wright HT (1977) Recent research on the origin of the state. Annu Rev Anthropol 6:
379–397.
42. Crumley CL (1995) Heterarchy and the Analysis of Complex Societies, eds
Ehrenreich RM, Crumley CL, Levy JE (Archaeological Papers of the American An-
thropological Association, Arlington, VA), Vol 6, pp 1–5.
43. Blanton R, Fargher L (2008) Collective Action in the Formation of Pre-Modern States
(Springer, Berlin).
44. Carballo DM, Roscoe P, Feinman GM (2014) Cooperation and collective action in the
cultural evolution of complex societies. J Archaeol Method Theory 21:98–133.
45. Bondarenko DM, Grinin LE, Korotayev AV (2002) Alternative pathways of social
evolution. Soc Evol Hist 1:54.
46. Bellah RN (2011) Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age
(Harvard Univ Press, Cambridge, MA).
47. Turchin P (2016) Ultrasociety: How 10,000 Years of War Made Humans the Greatest
Cooperators on Earth (Beresta Books, Chaplin, CT).
48. Wright HT (1986) American Archeology Past and Future, ed Meltzer DJ (Smithsonian
Institute, Washington, DC), pp 323–365.
49. Drennan RD (1991) Pre-hispanic chiefdom trajectories in Mesoamerica, Central
America, and northern South America. Chiefdoms: Power, Economy, and Ideology, ed
Earle TK (Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge, UK), p 263.
50. Kirch PV (1984) The Evolution of the Polynesian Chiefdoms, New Studies in Archae-
ology (Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge, UK).
51. Claessen HJM, Skalník P (1978) The Early State (Moulton Publishers, The Hague, The
Netherlands).
52. Trigger BG (2003) Understanding Early Civilizations: A Comparative Study (Cambridge
Univ Press, Cambridge, UK).
53. Johnson AW, Earle T (2000) The Evolution of Human Societies (Stanford Univ Press,
Stanford, CA).
54. Flannery K, Marcus J (2012) The Creation of Inequality: How Our Prehistoric Ancestors
Set the Stage for Monarchy, Slavery, and Empire (Harvard Univ Press, Cambridge,
MA).
55. Spencer CS (1997) Evolutionary approaches in archaeology. J Archaeol Res 5:209–264.
56. Kirch PV, Green RC (1997) History, phylogeny, and evolution in Polynesia. Curr
Anthropol 33:161–186.
57. Spencer CS (2009) Macroevolution in Human Prehistory, eds Prentiss AM, Kuijt I,
Chatters JC (Springer, New York), pp 133–156.
58. McShea DW (1994) Mechanisms of large-scale evolutionary trends. Evolution 48:
1747–1763.
59. McShea DW (2001) The minor transitions in hierarchical evolution and the question of
a directional bias. J Evol Biol 14:502–518.
60. Carneiro RL (1970) A theory of the origin of the state: Traditional theories of state
origins are considered and rejected in favor of a new ecological hypothesis. Science
169:733–738.
61. Currie TE, et al. (2015) Agricultural productivity in past societies: Toward an empiri-
cally informed model for testing cultural evolutionary hypotheses. Cliodynamics 6:
24–56.
62. Whitehouse H, François P, Turchin P (2015) The role of ritual in the evolution of social
complexity: Five predictions and a drum roll. Cliodynamics 6:199–216.
63. Rubin DB (1987) Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys (Wiley, New York).
64. Yuan Y (2000) Multiple Imputation for Missing Data: Concepts and New
Developments (SAS Institute, Rockville, MD), p 267.
65. Turchin P (2003) Complex Population Dynamics: A Theoretical/Empirical Synthesis
(Princeton Univ Press, Princeton).
66. Burnham KP, Anderson DR (2002) Model Selection and Multi-Model Inference: A
Practical Information-Theoretic Approach (Springer, New York).
67. R Core Team (2015) R: A language and environment for statistical computing
(R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna).
8 of 8 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1708800115 Turchin et al.
